About the CourtConferencesPCCEU, Bled, 30 September - 2 October 2004Presentation by Dr Jiri Mucha, Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic
Presentation by Dr Jiri Mucha, Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic
Dr. Jiři Mucha, Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic
Dear Mrs. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,
First of all please allow me to praise, on behalf of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, the idea of organizing this international conference, the theme of which is a set of issues highly topical for the Constitutional Courts in the new member countries of the European Union; I should also like to thank the Slovenian Constitutional Court and its President - Dr. Dragica Wedam Lukić, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe and its President – Professor Antonio La Pergola, for the invitation.
In my contribution I would like to mention three circles of issues connected with the membership of the Czech Republic in the European Union: the constitutional basis upon which Community law is applied in the Czech legal order; the relationship of the national constitutional system and of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic to the Community law and constitutional system and to the European Court of Justice; and finally the recent developments in the European system of the protection of human rights, represented namely by the European Convention on Human Rights, and most recently also the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – all that from the point of view of the Constitutional Court and its future operation.
Constitutional Basis of the Application of the Community Law in the Czech Republic’s Legal Order
After modifying the Czech Constitution in the year 2001 through the so called euro-amendment, i.e. the Constitutional Act No. 395/2001 Coll., the constitutional anchorage of the application of the Community law in the national legal order of the Czech Republic is being mentioned above all in the context of the following two articles of the Czech Constitution:
Article 10 of the Constitution, in its amended wording, provides that promulgated international treaties, which were consented for ratification by the Parliament and by which the Czech Republic is bound, form part of the legal order; should a provision of an international treaty differ from a provision of a law, the international treaty shall be applied. Compared to the previous wording of this article, which ensured an immediate binding force and primacy over a law only for international treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Czech constitutional system has undergone a remarkable move from a dualistic to a monistic view of the relationship between international and national law in general and in the relationship to the international treaties in particular; in connection with this, the special category of international treaties on human rights, as well as the privileged position of this special category of international treaties, were abolished.
The completely new Article 10a of the Constitution then contains the so called "integration clause" that created an essential constitutional basis for the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union: through an international treaty, some powers of the Czech Republic’s bodies can be delegated to an international organisation or institution. The integration clause thus enabled the Czech Republic to assign, through the accession agreement, a part of its own powers to the European Union.
Some opinions appeared in expert discussions, which called in question the constitutional anchorage of the application of the Community law in the national law; these opinions considered solely the above-mentioned Article 10 of the Constitution as a basis for such application. This article appears to be insufficient in the light of the doctrine of the primacy of the Community law over the national law. This is, however, an inadequate understanding of the overall philosophy of the so called euro-amendment of the Constitution – the constitutional basis of incorporation and application of the Community law in the Czech Republic is exactly and exclusively the "integration clause", i.e. the above mentioned Article 10a of the Constitution. As a consequence of the assignment of powers of some bodies of the Czech Republic to the European Union through the accession agreement, in thus delimited sphere the national legislation is either not applied any more (in the area of the exclusive competency of the European Union), or the national legislation is applied concurrently with Community acts operating on the basis of the rules of the European Union (in the area of shared competency of the Union and a member state).
Articles 10 and 10a of the Constitution apply to various types of international treaties. Hence there is no need to deal with the question of the application of the directives and regulations of the European Union under the stipulations of Article 10, i.e. only if they provide something different than a law. In the light of Article 10a of the Constitution, some resources of the Community law, e.g. regulations, are in fact applied instead of laws, albeit of exactly the same contents, and as a consequence of the delegation of some powers they have a factual application primacy not only over laws (which is normal with international treaties covered by Article 10 of the Constitution), but in principle also over the national Constitution.
Relationship of the National Constitutional System and of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic to the Community Law System and to the Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice
What consequences can the extension of the effect of the Community law upon the Czech Republic have for the powers and the operation of Czech Constitutional Court? This is an extremely broad set of issues, therefore on this forum I cannot but concentrate on a few brief remarks, which obviously express merely my own views of this matter; the Constitutional Court as an institution shall formulate its approach through its specific decision-making activity in the future.
A question arising in this context from the practical point of view at the first place is, whether the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic is a court as follows from Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, meaning a court that refers preliminary questions to the European Court of Justice concerning controvertible aspects of interpretation or validity of a provision of Community law. The practice of the constitutional courts of the European Union member countries and the positions of these courts towards the procedure pursuant to Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community are well known to be different from one another; hence a universally acceptable approach does not seem to exist.
It must be stated beforehand, that even if the Constitutional Court will be such a court as follows from Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the fact itself will not divest namely the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, i.e. the two paramount courts of the ordinary judiciary in the Czech Republic, of their position of courts against the rulings of which no appeal is possible, and therefore have a principal obligation as per Article 234 par. 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community to refer a preliminary question to the European Court of Justice. A constitutional plea, in fact, is not a remedy as follows from Article 234 par. 3 of the Treaty establishing the European Community; the Constitutional Court is not just another instance in the ordinary judiciary – it is not superior to ordinary courts; a constitutional plea essentially serves the purpose of defending fundamental rights based on the national Constitution, which is a different purpose than that of a remedy as stipulated in Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. But in spite of that, I assume that the Czech Constitutional Court should feel free to undergo, in certain circumstances, the procedure as follows from Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, although these circumstances are likely to be of a rather exceptional nature – due to the position of the ordinary judiciary and above all the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court.
First of all a reference should be made to the fact that the issue of the definition of a court as per Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community is an issue of the Community law rather than national law. The European Court of Justice understands a court according to Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community on the one hand as a body defined as a court by national law, and upon the other hand as a body that is not defined as a court by national law, but meets some characteristic features laid down by the European Court of Justice (it must be a body established on the basis of a statute that has an obligation to make decisions independently and in accordance with law and that performs systematically its judging functions – i.e. issues binding decisions on rights and duties of individual persons and/or corporate entities). The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic then undoubtedly is a body that meets this Community definition of a court as per Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
Also considering pragmatic reasons, it would not be suitable to exclude a possible intervention of the Constitutional Court at the European Court of Justice based on a procedure stipulated under Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The institute of a preliminary question provides national courts with a relatively effective opportunity to formulate their own idea of accurate interpretation of the Community law and get the European Court of Justice acquainted with the impact of its own interpretation in individual cases and with their own national peculiarities. Convincing arguments of a national court can inspire the European Court of Justice to create an exception from its previous interpretation of Community law, or even to change the case law. In such a context, an intervention of the Constitutional Court could be opportune and expedient namely in the issues of interpretation and application of Community standards of fundamental rights by the European Court of Justice. The Constitutional Court would have an opportunity to formulate its own opinion concerning the purport and interpretation of the European human rights principles; its argumentation should, however, be based on the perspective of the Community law with comparative utilisation of the constitutional arrangements of other member countries of the European Union and of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights – i.e. not exclusively or prevailingly on the perspective of interpretation of the standards provided by the national Constitution. In fact, it follows from the logic of the decentralized system of European law, that any national court, including a constitutional court, becomes a European court when deciding on matters involving the Community law.
As I mentioned before, the use of the procedure under Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community by the Constitutional Court is likely to be rare and exceptional; the Constitutional Court will be able, however, by way of deciding on constitutional pleas lodged by individuals, to defend the application of the Community law wherever not a mere violation of the ordinary Community law will be in question, i.e. without the human rights dimension, but where the fundamental rights will be jeopardized. The Constitutional Court will fulfil its role of protection of human rights in the best manner by merely monitoring, in principle, whether the national courts meet their obligation to refer a case to the European Court of Justice for preliminary judgment pursuant to Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The Constitutional Court will also be able to decide by itself upon appropriate interpretation of the Community law based on a constitutional plea; this, however, only when the given rule has been already interpreted by the European Court of Justice; its role will be strictly subsidiary and the case law of the Constitutional Court must follow upon the case law of the European Court of Justice. Should an ordinary court, against the decision of which no appeal is possible, fail to observe its obligation to refer a preliminary question to the European Court of Justice as stipulated under Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, repeal of such a final judgment by the Constitutional Court will be possible based on a constitutional plea, on the basis of the violation of the right to a statutory judge guaranteed by Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.
European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Development of the European System of the Protection of Fundamental Rights
Finally please allow me to make several observations concerning the recent development of the European system of the protection of fundamental rights.
The Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe envisages in Title II of Part 1, Article I-7, dedicated to fundamental rights, the undertaking of two steps, which in the case of the acceptance of the Constitution of the European Union in the proposed wording may mean a remarkable change in the European system of the protection of human rights: the Charter of Fundamental Rights is to become a part of the European Constitution, and the Union shall seek accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
If we avoid superficial enthusiasm and assess the presumable development soberly, we cannot avoid a question whether the European Union has really set out on a journey towards the strengthening of the protection of an individual, or rather to a chaos of different procedures, to a mutual competition of dual case laws, and finally to double standards of the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. Naturally, this is a question of the future relationship between two existing systems of the protection of fundamental rights, i.e. between the relatively stable system of the European Convention on Human Rights in the framework of the Council of Europe, and the dynamically developing system of the European Union.
Forty-five member states of the Council of Europe are now parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, including all twenty-five states of the European Union, which are subject to the control mechanism of the European Court of Human Rights. The states, with only rare exceptions, abide by the judgments of the Strasbourg Court – their respect to these judgments is even surprisingly high. While in the former case law of the Strasbourg bodies any complaints aiming directly against the acts of the bodies of the European Communities used to be rejected as inadmissible ratione personae stating that the European Communities are not party to the Convention, a noteworthy development has been marked the last few years. The most distinct decision thus far, modifying the approach of the Court in this area, is the judgment of the European Court in the case of Matthews vs. United Kingdom from the year 1999, in which, for the first time ever, a member state of the European Union was condemned for a conduct based immediately on the Community law. Other complainants have based their petitions on the Matthews case in the meantime. This development in the case law of the Strasbourg Court probably means of the incentives contributing to larger efforts at pushing ahead the accession of the European Union to the European Convention. But will the inception of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and its incorporation into the constitutional treaty represent any substantial benefit for a citizen of the Union? I admit I am rather sceptical in this respect. I am afraid the Charter does not fully meet the objective it was created for; in fact, the objective was supposed to be mainly a better transparency and simplification of the protection of fundamental rights for individuals.
From the material point of view, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is nothing but a compilation of the stipulations of the European Convention, which was the main resource of its contents, and relevant stipulations of some more recent international treaties, as well as a reflection of some relevant case laws of the European Court of Justice and the secondary legislation of the European Communities; in simple words, it does not bring about anything that was not contained already in the above mentioned sources – and this regards also the "modern" rights connected with bioethics or with the right to the protection of personal data. The Charter includes, however, some stipulations, the inclusion of which into the catalogue of fundamental rights – in the sense of subjective individual rights – is rather doubtable, such as, for example, a proclamatory setting of principles and goals (diversity of cultures), access to medical care, environmental protection, and consumer protection.
In my view, the most sophisticated – and today not more than theoretical, I am afraid – solution would have been the accession of the Communities to the European Convention before the actual inception of the Charter. The observance of the rights included in the today's Charter, which overlap with the European Treaty, would then be singularly guaranteed and controlled by the Strasburg Court on the basis of direct complaints from the citizens regarding all acts of national and Union authorities.
The current wording of the Article 7 of the Constitutional Treaty practically leaves only two realistic options of the future development:
The Charter will become a binding part of the Constitution, but the Union will not use the newly created legal possibility to access the Convention. From the point of view of an integral protection of the fundamental rights in Europe, such a solution would not be providential – it would establish the existence of two binding and mutually overlapping catalogues of fundamental rights, offering two completely different procedural options of seeking a judicial protection, controlled by two courts having different competencies, with the subsequent risk of a gradual yet inevitable rise of two different standards of human rights in a should-be integrated legal and political area of the European Union .
The second – and in my view, with the present status quo, the only relatively satisfactory – alternative is (even upon the assumption of a legally binding Charter) the accession of the Union to the European Convention and its engagement in the Strasburg system of the protection of fundamental rights. This would eliminate the threat of an impending procedural duality of the protection and the rise of different interpretations of the same fundamental rights in Europe. The multi-stage, expensive and time-demanding system of judicial protection of fundamental rights, which is already burdening for a citizen both at the national and the European levels, would perhaps not have to become even less transparent and comprehensible.

