Slika prikazuje stopnišče.

The Constitutional Court decided on a petition and constitutional complaint of the State Prosecutor General, the Office of the State Prosecutor General, and the Supreme Court against Article 1 of the Parliamentary Investigation Act in conjunction with the Act Ordering a Parliamentary Investigation in the Case of Franc Kangler and Others. The State Prosecutor General and the Office of the State Prosecutor General also challenged the mentioned Act and the Rules on Parliamentary Investigation because these two acts allegedly failed to regulate an appropriate mechanism by which it would be possible to prevent parliamentary investigations that unconstitutionally interfere with the autonomy and independence of the performance of the function of the State Prosecutor’s Office.

To begin with, the Constitutional Court drew attention to its hitherto case law, in accordance with which the State Prosecutor’s Office is part of the executive branch of power, but autonomous in relation to other authorities of the executive branch of power and independent in relation to the legislative and judicial branches of power. It explained that state prosecutors do not in any way entail a part of the executive branch of power, which could be subject to political supervision and political accountability. On the contrary, the autonomy and independence of state prosecutors, which follows from the constitutional function of criminal prosecution, prohibit political meddling in the performance of the function of the State Prosecutor’s Office in concrete cases. The mentioned constitutional position of the State Prosecutor’s Office must also be taken into consideration when ordering and carrying out parliamentary investigations. In the assessment of the Constitutional Court, such does not entail that the Constitution prohibits any parliamentary investigation that refers to the performance of the function of the State Prosecutor’s Office. It entails, however, that it is not admissible to influence, by a parliamentary investigation, the decision of state prosecutors on whether in a certain concrete case they will initiate or discontinue criminal prosecution and how they will conduct the criminal prosecution procedure. If a parliamentary investigation is ordered or requested with the intention of ascertaining the correctness of concrete decisions or actions of state prosecutors that fall within the remit of the function of the State Prosecutor’s Office or to assess the liability of state prosecutors for such decisions or actions, the mere ordering of such parliamentary investigation is inconsistent with the constitutionally guaranteed independence of state prosecutors referred to in Article 135 of the Constitution and in the second sentence of the second paragraph of Article 3 of the Constitution.

Further down in the Decision, the Constitutional Court addressed the question of the procedural protection of the independence of the State Prosecutor’s Office in a procedure for ordering a parliamentary investigation. It explained that the legislation does not envisage judicial protection, a legal remedy, or any other effective procedure by which it would be possible to prevent parliamentary investigations that unconstitutionally interfere with the independence of state prosecutors, although the existence of such procedures is of key importance for the functioning of a state governed by the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and for independent, impartial, and fair judicial decision-making. The Constitutional Court decided that such a procedure could be introduced in conformity with the constitutional system of the separation of powers and in a manner that would not jeopardise the effective performance of parliamentary investigations. According to the Constitutional Court, the Constitution requires the existence of such a procedure.

In view of the above, the Constitutional Court established that the challenged Parliamentary Investigation Act and the Rules on Parliamentary Investigation are inconsistent with the first paragraph of Article 135 and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Article 3 of the Constitution.

Within the framework of the review of the constitutionality of the Act Ordering a Parliamentary Investigation in the Case of Franc Kangler and Others, the Constitutional Court analysed the parts of the Act that refer to the performance of the function of the State Prosecutor’s Office and assessed that in this part the investigation refers to the assessment of whether it was lawful to initiate and carry out a criminal prosecution procedure in that concrete case. It concluded that the Act Ordering a Parliamentary Investigation in the Case of Franc Kangler and Others is in this part inconsistent with the independence of state prosecutors, and thus abrogated it to that extent.