In a commercial dispute, the complainant claimed the nullity of a contractual term on the basis of which it was allegedly not entitled to the reimbursement of VAT concerning a project financed from European cohesion funds. The complainant alleged, inter alia, that on the basis of EU law rules it is entitled to the reimbursement of VAT and that the applicable rules are cogent in nature. The first and second instance courts adjudicated differently and dismissed its claim. They adopted the position that, on the basis of EU law rules, a Member State has the right of choice whether it will deem VAT a justified expenditure that can be reimbursed. They did not submit the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling. In its motion to file an appeal before the Supreme Court, the complainant proposed anew that the case be submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling. The Supreme Court dismissed the motion to file an appeal before the Supreme Court and substantiated its decision merely with reference to the inexistence of the conditions for allowing an appeal, as is expressly allowed by the Civil Procedure Act. It did not adopt a position as to the motion of the complainant that the case be submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling.
In the case of financing from cohesion funds, this is a field regulated by the European Union by its acts, therefore courts must interpret national regulations in light of EU law and in conformity with its purpose. Such entails that, when interpreting the Constitution, also the Constitutional Court must take into account the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union that was formed on the basis thereof, because the application of EU law is at issue. The right to a reasoned judicial decision, which is protected by Article 22 of the Constitution, is of special importance also in EU law. It is protected by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Court of Justice of the European Union interprets it such that it includes the obligation of courts to explain why the [competent] national court did not submit the case for a preliminary ruling. The [competent] national court must adopt a position as to the motion for a preliminary ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union with sufficient clarity and must, in doing so, take into consideration the criteria that stem from Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. This duty to provide a reasoning also applies in the event the national procedural regulation determines that a court may only substantiate its decision by referring to the fact that the conditions for considering the case are not fulfilled (a so-called summary reasoning).
In the case at issue, the Supreme Court only substantiated the dismissal of the motion to file an appeal before the Supreme Court by referring to the provision of the Civil Procedure Act that determines that a reasoning by which the court refers in general to the inexistence of the conditions for allowing the appeal before the Supreme Court suffices. This provision of the Civil Procedure Act must be interpreted consistently with EU law and thus in a constitutionally consistent manner, such that in the event a party files a motion to submit the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling, the order not allowing the appeal before the Supreme Court also contains a reasoning as to why the Supreme Court did not grant the party’s motion.
Since the Supreme Court failed to substantiate why it did not grant the party’s motion to submit the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling, the Constitutional Court abrogated the challenged order due to a violation of the right to the equal protection of rights determined by Article 22 of the Constitution in conjunction with the right to judicial protection determined by the first paragraph of Article 23 of the Constitution.
